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INTRODUCTION 
  
Section 1983 is intended to redress violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights 
by persons acting under the color of law, “state actors.”1  Throughout the history of section 1983, 
two inquiries, though shifting in form, have consistently remained at the core of section 1983’s 
ability to redress statutory violations.  First the violated statute must grant a federal right.2  Not 
all statutes create federal rights and thus simply alleging a violation of a federal statute will not 
suffice. 3  Second, even if the plaintiff has successfully asserted the violation of a federal right, 
the statute must no expressly or impliedly foreclose section 1983 relief.4 
Three terms integral to understanding section 1983’s role in remedying violated rights are 
right, right of action, and remedy. Although judicial opinions at times use those terms in an 
interchangeable manner,5 such treatment is unfortunate. Section 1983 jurisprudence is best 
served when they are treated as separate and distinct terms.  
 A statute can create a federal right through either express statutory provisions or impliedly.6 
The Constitution provides the clearest example of expressly granted rights. For example, the 
Fourth Amendment gives us the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizures.7 In 
contrast many civil rights statutes impliedly grant rights. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 grant implied rights by using language that 
has “an unmistakable focus on the benefited class.”8  Title IX states “[n]o person in the United 
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”9 This is the type of rights-granting language that the Court has specifically 
pointed to as statutorily creating implied rights.10 
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In addition to being able to grant rights either expressly or impliedly, Congress can also 
provide a right of action to vindicate those rights either expressly or impliedly. The Educational 
Handicapped Act (now named Education of Individuals with Disabilities Act), which was at 
issue in Smith v. Robinson11 and the Telecommunications Act at issue in City of Rancho Palos 
Verdes v. Abrams,12 both contain express rights of action, whereas Title IX and Title VI have 
implied rights of action.13   
If a statute contains an implied right then logically everything that follows from the implied 
right will also be implied. It is not possible for a statute to have an implied right and then an 
express cause of action to defend that right. Thus once the Court finds an implied right, we know 
that the statute will contain either no right of action or an implied right of action. And if the 
statute contains an implied right of action then the remedies will be implied as well. 
Express rights differ in this regard. A statute granting an express right may contain an 
express right of action, an implied right of action, or no right of action. The Constitution 
expressly grants rights but does not provide a right of action to enforce those rights.14 This is 
where section 1983 traditionally enters the picture—it provides the right of action to enforce 
violated rights.15 
Further even if an express right of action accompanies the express right, the statute may still 
be silent as to what remedies the Court may apply in granting relief. The Telecommunications 
Act provides an express right of action, but is silent as to what remedies apply.16 When a statute 
grants a right of action but is silent as to what remedies are available the Court may imply all 
necessary remedies.17  
There is a presumption favoring section 1983’s applicability whenever a federal right is 
violated.18 This presumption operates regardless of whether the right is express or implied, 
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regardless of whether there is already a separate right of action and regardless of whether 
remedies are already available to the plaintiff. Nevertheless this presumption favoring the 
application of section 1983 may be rebutted if the statute expressly or impliedly forecloses its 
use.19  Express foreclosure occurs in circumstances where the statute uses language similar to—
“the remedies in this statute are intended to be the exclusive remedies.” Alternatively statutes 
impliedly foreclose the use of section 1983 when they “contain comprehensive enforcement 
mechanisms.”20  
 This Paper argues that exceptions to section 1983’s general applicability that are 
premised on Congressional intent should only apply to statutes that contain express provisions 
thereof. Once the Court begins to consider what is implied in a statute, the inquiry into whether 
section 1983 applies should end. Thus if the Court finds an implied right section 1983 can be 
used to redress a violation of that right, if the Court finds an implied right of action for the 
violation of a right then 1983 can still be used, and finally if the Court implies remedies then 
section 1983 must remain applicable. Therefore in express right cases the Court should not use 
implied rights of action, or implied remedies as evidence that congress intended to foreclose 
section 1983 relief.  
Nevertheless in City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams21 the Court precluded section 1983 
relief when a statute contained an express right of action but no express remedies.22  Even though 
the statute lacked express remedy provisions, the Court concluded that the availability of 
remedies within the violated statute created an inference that those remedies are to be the 
exclusive relief unless there are textual indications that other remedies, for example section 1983 
relief, should apply.23  The question that necessarily follows is whether implied rights statutes 
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that contain implied rights of action and implied remedies will be used to preclude section 1983 
relief and consequently 42 U.S.C. § 1988 attorney’s fees.   
This Paper suggests that the Court should not preclude section 1983 relief in implied rights 
cases by using implied rights of action and implied remedies as evidence of Congress’s intent. 
When a statute on its face is silent as to the existence of a right, or a right of action or  the 
existence of remedies, then how could it contain provisions indicating that the implied right of 
action or implied remedies, which it does not mention, preclude section 1983 relief? If Congress 
has not foreclosed 1983 relief through express provisions then the Court ought not to find that it 
has been foreclosed.24  
 This Paper proceeds in three parts.  Part I considers how implied rights and implied rights 
of action are created and discusses the Court’s use of implied remedies in rectifying violations of 
federal rights.  Part II discusses two circumstances where the comprehensive enforcement 
mechanism exception is used to foreclose section 1983 relief. It considers the comprehensive 
enforcement mechanism exception’s role in cases where the Court either implies a right, a right 
of action or a remedy. Part III outlines how Rancho Palos affects section 1983 and further details 
how the Court could use the broad language in the Rancho Palos decision to preclude section 
1983 relief in implied right—implied right of action cases. It argues that limitations to section 
1983 relief should be based on congressional intent and that congressional intent to foreclose 
section 1983 cannot be found in implied rights of action and implied remedies.  Part IV uses the 
Sixth Circuit decision in Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Association25 
(Communities for Equity) to outline the current divide on section 1983’s applicability to statutes 
containing implied rights and implied rights of action.  Part V suggests an alternative method of 
precluding section 1983 relief, including looking to the purpose of the statute.  
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I. DEFINING IMPLIED RIGHT, IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION, AND IMPLIED REMEDY.  
 
This Part discusses when a statute creates an implied right, an implied right of action, and 
implied remedies.  This Part will provide the necessary basis for understanding how implied 
rights, implied rights of actions, and implied remedies fit into the determination of whether 
section 1983 applies. It also provides background information that will aid in demonstrating how 
the inquiry into whether congress has foreclosed section 1983 remedies should end once the 
Court finds an implied right, an implied right of action, or an implied remedy.        
 
A. When does a Statute Contain an Implied Right?  
 
Because finding an express federal right merely consists of pointing to the statutory 
language that expressly grants that right, a straight forward task, this section will focus on when 
implied rights are created in federal statutes.  Prior to Gonzaga University v. Doe, the standard 
for finding an implied federal right actionable under section 1983 consisted of a less than 
exacting three part test.  The test is best summarized in Blessing v. Freestone.26 First, Congress 
must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff.27  Second, the right 
claimed to be protected by the statute must not be so vague and amorphous that its enforcement 
would strain judicial competence.28  Finally, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding 
obligation on the states—the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in 
mandatory rather than precatory terms.29  In Blessing the Court left open the possibility that Title 
IV-D created federally enforceable rights for mothers of children who were eligible to receive 
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child support services and remanded the case to the district court for a determination of what 
rights were specifically being asserted by the plaintiffs.30   
While Gonzaga did not overrule earlier section 1983 implied right case law and the 
corresponding Blessing three factor inquiry, it did reject the notion that the preceding cases 
permitted “anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action 
brought under section 1983.”31  Under Gonzaga a statute creates private rights, implied rights, 
when the text is phrased in terms of the persons benefited.32  It held that the requirements to 
create implied rights enforceable under section 1983 are the same requirements for the creation 
of a new right enforceable under an implied right of action.33  As an example of statutes creating 
implied rights enforceable under an implied right of action, the Court pointed to Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 which had “an 
unmistakable focus on the benefited class.”34   
 
B. Creation of an Implied Right of Action 
 
An implied right of action can be used to fight a violation of either an express or implied 
right. The Court most often considers its utility in implied rights cases.  In addition to clarifying 
what constitutes an implied right, the Gonzaga decision also elaborated on when a statute creates 
an implied right of action. The Court distinguished between implied rights enforced through 
section 1983 and implied rights enforced under implied rights of action, by noting that when a 
plaintiff sues under an implied right of action, the plaintiff “still must show that the statute 
manifests an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy.”35  Whereas, 
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plaintiffs suing under section 1983 do not have to show a congressional intent to create private 
remedy because section 1983 supplies remedies for vindication of federal rights.36  
Thus, in implied right of action cases the judicial task is to determine whether the statute 
displays an intent to create not just a private right, an implied right, but also a private remedy, an 
implied remedy.37  Statutory intent on creating a private remedy is determinative.38  Without it, 
an implied right of action does not exist.39  Consequently, if a statute creates an express or 
implied right and the statute does not manifest an intent to create a remedy then no right of action 
will be implied.  However, if a statute creates a right then it will be actionable under section 1983 
when a state actor violates it.40 Thus inquiring into whether a statute creates an implied right of 
action seems to be most important when a federal right is violated by someone other than a “state 
actor.”  
Under this scheme an implied right’s enforceability under section 1983 does not depend 
on whether the statute itself has an implied right of action. Nevertheless the possibility of using 
an implied right of action to foreclose section 1983 relief has been left open. This is what is at 
stake in the circuit split concerning Title IX, which contains an implied right, an implied right of 
action, and necessarily implied remedies.   
 
C. Implied Remedies 
 
Implied remedies can be used with both express rights of action and implied rights of 
action. When a statute contains an express or implied right of action or when a section 1983 
action applies, a court can afford all necessary relief.41  Hence when a statute contains a right of 
action but lacks remedial provisions all remedies are impliedly available.42  For implied rights 
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cases the Court has stated that implied rights of action are only available if a court finds an intent 
to create a remedy.43 Under this reasoning a statute will either have both an implied right of 
action and implied remedy or neither.44  If there is no intent to create a remedy then the statute 
does not contain an implied remedy nor an implied right of action. In contrast “plaintiffs suing 
under § 1983 do not have the burden of showing an intent to create a private remedy because § 
1983 generally supplies a remedy for the vindication of rights secured by federal statutes.”45  
Further section 1983 supplies all remedies necessary.46 
Prior to discussing Rancho Palos’ potential effect on both implied right-implied right of 
action cases or express right-implied right of action cases, further elaboration of the current 
exceptions to section 1983’s general applicability is necessary.  Currently there is at least one 
well established limiting factor that precludes section 1983 relief—the comprehensive 
enforcement mechanism.  Even if a court finds that a statute creates a federal right the defendant 
can show that section 1983 should not be used to enforce that right because the statute in 
question contains a comprehensive enforcement mechanism.47  Part II discusses the two 
situations where a comprehensive enforcement mechanism can preclude section 1983 relief.  
 
II. The Comprehensive Enforcement Mechanism Exception to Section 1983: Finding 
Congressional Intent to Foreclose Section 1983 Relief.  
 
As Part I previously detailed, Congress can create express or implied rights—this Part 
discusses when Congress precludes section 1983 relief for those rights.  Recognizing 
circumstances where section 1983 cannot be used to vindicate violated federal rights is important 
in effectuating congressional intent.  The presumption in favor of enforcing federal rights under 
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section 1983 can be rebutted by showing that Congress has foreclosed such enforcement.48  Such 
a foreclosure can occur either expressly or impliedly.49 Express foreclosure occurs in 
circumstances where a statutory provision states that either the remedies in this statute are 
exclusive, or that section 1983 does not apply to the statute.  Because instances of express 
foreclosure are easy to identify and express foreclosure is not particularly relevant to implied 
right-implied right of action cases this Part focuses on the comprehensive enforcement 
mechanism exception.   
The comprehensive enforcement mechanism exception can preclude 1983 relief in two 
situations. The first situation is where the statute lacks an express right. Here finding a 
comprehensive enforcement mechanism can cut off the inquiry into whether the statute has an 
implied right. The comprehensive enforcement mechanism is in a sense used to find that 
Congress intended not to create actionable federal rights under a particular statute. Thus the 
Court the can use it to preclude private actions without delving into the traditional implied right 
inquiry.  This is what happened in Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers 
Ass’n50 (Sea Clammers) the case that established the comprehensive enforcement mechanism 
exception.51  Next the comprehensive enforcement mechanism exception can foreclose section 
1983 relief when the statute contains both an express right and an elaborate remedial scheme.  
While it is acceptable for the comprehensive enforcement mechanism exception to be 
used to foreclose section 1983 relief when there is an express right, it is inappropriate to do so 
when the right is implied. Consideration of the roots of the comprehensive enforcement 
mechanism inquiry illustrates its inadequacy in addressing whether section 1983 is an 
appropriate source of relief to remedy an implied right violation.  The seminal comprehensive 
enforcement mechanism case, Sea Clammers, concerned statutes with express causes of action, 
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express remedies, and most notably express enforcement requirements, which included providing 
notice sixty days prior to the commencement of the action.52   
 
A. Sea Clammers: Foreclosing Section 1983 Relief Prior to Finding an Implied Right. 
 
Foreclosure by a comprehensive enforcement mechanism first emerged when the Court 
considered two environmental protection statutes in Sea Clammers.53  Each statute provided an 
express right of action through citizen’s suit provisions.54  The Court precluded section 1983 
relief prior to determining if the statute created rights and accordingly declined to decide whether 
the two statutes granted implied rights.55  
The Court found that the enforcement mechanisms, including citizen suit provisions 
evidenced Congress’s intent to foreclose a section 1983 remedy under the statutes and 
accordingly did not reach the issue of whether the statutes created rights within the meaning of 
section 1983.56 The Court reasoned that in light of the “elaborate enforcement provisions” within 
the two statutes one could presume that Congress intended not to authorize additional judicial 
remedies through section 1983.57  
In Sea Clammers the requirements for bringing suit were part of the statutes’ enforcement 
mechanisms.58  Had the statutes not contained citizen suits with express remedies, there would 
have been “other enforcement mechanisms,” namely criminal or civil suits brought by 
government entities.59  What the case left unresolved is the effect that these “other enforcement 
mechanisms,” being those that did not authorize a private right of action, would have on 
precluding 1983 if there was an implied right.  As noted in some circuit decisions express 
enforcement mechanisms that do not directly vindicate the violated federal right are usually not 
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considered comprehensive enforcement mechanisms for the preclusion of 1983 relief.60  It is 
unlikely that the Court will ever find that “other enforcement mechanisms” such as criminal 
penalties and suits by government entities—mechanisms not involving a private right of action—
would ever be considered sufficient in redressing an implied federal right violation.  It seems 
incongruous that the Court would find that Congress intended to create an implied right but then 
foreclose any private action to vindicate that right. 
Sea Clammers established the general proposition that “[w]hen remedial devices 
provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive they may suffice to demonstrate 
congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under section 1983.”61  Later this exception 
came to be phrased as whether the statute contained a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is 
incompatible with individual enforcement under section 1983.62   
 
B. Smith v. Robinson: Preclusion of Section 1983 Relief when a Statute Contains and Express 
right and Express Remedial Provisions.  
 
A variation of the comprehensive enforcement mechanism has been used to preclude the 
award of attorney’s fees for a violation of a constitutional right when there is an identical 
statutory right and the statute contains an elaborate enforcement mechanism.  In Smith v. 
Robinson, the Educational Handicapped Act precluded section 1983 relief for “identical” 
constitutional claims.63  In Smith parents sued under the Education of the Handicapped Act64 
(EHA), and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
pursuant to section 1983 alleging that their handicapped children were being denied a free 
appropriate public education.65  The Court framed the issue as whether “Congress intended the 
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EHA to be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert those claims.”66  In 
answering this question in the affirmative the Court reasoned that in light of the comprehensive 
nature of the procedures and guarantees it was hard to believe that Congress intend to allow 
plaintiffs to skip those procedures and go directly to court under section 1983.67 Thus section 
1983 could be not used for the violation of the rights granted under the Educational Handicapped 
Act.  The EHA enforcement procedures could not be bypassed by bringing suit directly under 
section 1983.68   
Consequently by precluding section 1983 relief, comprehensive enforcement mechanisms 
ensure that Congressional intent specifically evidenced through elaborate remedial schemes is 
preserved.  If Congress went through the pains of establishing a mechanism to enforce a specific 
statute, a statute that either expressly grants a right or doesn’t, then it is reasonable to conclude 
that Congress intended the mechanism to be followed and not skipped by resorting section 1983.  
Undoubtedly, the comprehensive enforcement mechanism has its place in section 1983 
jurisprudence. However, such an exception which is premised on the intent of Congress can only 
go so far. The comprehensive enforcement mechanism should only reach express statutory 
provisions. Once the Court begins to consider what is implied in a statute, the inquiry into 
whether section 1983 applies should end. Thus if a statute lacks an express right of action and 
express remedies then section 1983 should apply.  
Regardless of which situation the comprehensive enforcement mechanism is used, there 
must be "express provision or other specific evidence from the statute that Congress intended to 
foreclose [section 1983 relief].”69 However the force of this statement is called into question by 
the Rancho Palos decision.  The next Part explains Rancho Palos’ significance to section 1983 
14 
case law and explores the potential for courts to use the Rancho Palos decision to preclude 
section 1983 relief based on a finding of implied remedies.  
 
III. PRECLUSION OF SECTION 1983 RELIEF IN RANCHO PALOS. 
 
A. The Rancho Palos Decision.  
 
Although the traditional exception to section 1983 applicability in redressing violations 
of federal rights is the comprehensive enforcement mechanism, the development of other 
exceptions is possible.  Indeed, in Rancho Palos the Court seemed to seize on the “incompatible” 
aspect of the comprehensive enforcement mechanism to hold that a statute requiring plaintiff to 
bring suit within 30 days of final administrative action and providing for expedited judicial 
review foreclosed section 1983 relief.70  The Court essentially concluded that the 30 day statute 
of limitations is incompatible with the general rule that the state statute of limitations for 
personal-injury torts apply when bringing claims under section 1983.71  
In addition to the statutory provisions that arguably are incompatible with section 1983 
relief, the Court provides a second line of reasoning to support its holding: whether the violated 
statute affords private remedies at all.  The Court couches the case’s issue in terms of remedies; 
it stated that “[t]he critical question, then, is whether Congress meant the judicial remedy 
expressly authorized by § 332(c)(7) to coexist with an alternate remedy available in a § 1983 
action.”72  Although it is logical to conclude that a statute expressly authorizing a private right of 
action would also authorize remedies, to claim that those remedies cannot coexist with section 
1983 remedies does not necessarily follow.  At this juncture, it is interesting to note that the 
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statutory provision at issue in Rancho Palos does not provide any express remedies.73  Rather the 
Court found the provision of remedies in what relief district courts usually afford under the 
statute.74  If the statute does not mention the types of remedies allowed—as is the case in Rancho 
Palos—then how could the remedies be inconsistent with section 1983, which essentially allows 
all types relief. 75  Similarly when a statute lacks express remedies, the availability of all 
remedies is implied and courts are charged with applying those necessary to remedy the 
violation.76 
To make this line of reasoning more sensible, the Court restrained the general 
presumption which favored using section 1983 to redress federal rights violations.77  It noted that 
in all the cases where it has held that section 1983 relief is available the violated statute did not 
provide a private judicial remedy or, in most of the cases, even a private administrative remedy.78  
Although the Court declined to hold that the availability of a private judicial remedy 
conclusively establishes a congressional intent to preclude section 1983 relief, 79 its stance still 
serves to the presumption favoring section 1983 relief.  Without citing any authority, the Court 
stated that “[t]he ordinary inference that the remedy provided in the statute is exclusive can 
surely be overcome by textual indication, express or implicit, that the remedy is to complement, 
rather than supplant § 1983.”80  Thus if a statute provides a remedy, then the presumption is now 
against section 1983 relief.  
It is interesting to note that the Court may not have even had to consider whether the statute 
in and of itself foreclosed section 1983 relief. Following its own reasoning in Gonzaga, the Court 
could have decided the case on the basis that the statute does not contain a federal right. 
Although there is a right of action in the Telecommunications Act, it’s questionable whether 
there is a federally protected right. TCA prohibits state and local governments from regulating 
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wireless services on the basis of environmental affects and from unreasonably discriminating 
among providers of functionally equivalent services.81 In that purpose where is the unmistakable 
focus on the benefited class?82 Who is the benefited class for that matter? Certainly the benefited 
class can not be everyone who applies for a permit to build a radio tower and gets denied. 
Further the Act does not grant everybody the right to build radio antennas. Not every statute that 
provides benefits to people creates rights. FERPA which was at issue in Gonzaga v. Doe, clearly 
benefits students, as it prevents the unauthorized release of personally identifiable education 
records, and yet it does not grant a federal right to students.83  This would have been a more solid 
position from which to deny section 1983 relief.   
Finally, one important consideration present in the Rancho Palos decision concerns the 
effect of awarding attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 which is made applicable under section 
1983.  The Court reasons that “[l]iability for attorney’s fees would have a particularly severe 
impact in the § 332(c)(7) context, making local governments liable for (often substantial) legal 
expenses of large commercial interests for the misapplication of a complex and novel statutory 
scheme.”84  While the Court is aware of this policy reason, it does not give the potential fee 
shifting sufficient weight.  Section 1983 was prompted by the desire to have important 
constitutional and federal rights vindicated and so was section 1988, which awards attorney’s 
fees to the prevailing party in 1983 actions.85  The Court should not be reluctant in considering 
whether this is the type of right violation where state and local governments should pay the 
prevailing plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees.  
What is most troubling about this presumption is that it was created in a case that dealt 
with implied remedies and accordingly applies to implied remedies.  Precluding section 1983 
relief based on implied remedies threatens to eviscerate much of section 1983’s enforcement 
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powers.86  Section B discusses how the conception of remedies in Rancho Palos may be used to 
foreclose section 1983 relief in implied right–implied right of action cases and in express right–
implied right of action cases. It argues that implied rights of action with implied remedies should 
not be used to foreclose section 1983 relief. 
 
B. Extending Rancho Palos: Implied Rights of Action and Implied Remedies should not have a 
Preclusive Effect in Implied Right Cases. 
 
As Rancho Palos has established, the existence of a remedy reverses the presumption 
favoring section 1983 relief in express right of action-implied remedy cases.87  What remains to 
be seen is whether implied remedies in implied rights of action cases will have that same effect.  
As Part I discussed an implied right of action exists only when a court finds that Congress not 
only intended to create a federal right, but also a remedy.88  Although the Court has yet to 
preclude section 1983 relief in implied rights cases through implying a remedy, the Court’s 
reasoning in City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams makes this a distinct possibility. 
Rancho Palos’ presumptive reversal could have two substantially narrowing effects on 
section 1983 litigation.  First, following the Court’s line of reasoning leads one to conclude that 
any statute with an express private right of action also provides some sort of remedy.  In Rancho 
Palos there clearly was an express right of action—plaintiffs were authorized to bring their suits 
within 30 days of the agency’s final determination, and the claims were subject to expedited 
judicial review.89  Because there was a right of action and district courts have applied what they 
have determined to be appropriate relief in these Telecommunications Act cases, the Court 
concludes that the statute also provides a remedy.90  The existence of that remedy forecloses 
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section 1983 relief unless there is textual evidence that section 1983 may still be utilized.91  
Thus, if there is an express cause of action then section 1983 relief is precluded unless something 
in that statute—which does not mention remedies in the first place—indicates that section 1983 
relief applies.  What textual indications—short of saying section 1983 applies to this statue—
would rebut the presumption favoring foreclosure of section 1983 relief has yet to be determined. 
Implied remedies in express right of action cases should not preclude section 1983 relief 
because they are created by the judiciary and not by Congress. Allowing implied remedies to 
have a preclusive effect on section 1983 would give the judiciary too much arbitrary power over 
discerning when section 1983 and consequently section 1988 award of attorney’s fees are 
applicable to a case. Since section 1983 can provide all necessary remedies,92 it is unclear what 
types of remedies could be implied that would be inconsistent with 1983 remedial scheme unless 
one is look to section 1988’s award of attorney’s fee.  Thus under this scheme it appears that the 
main aim of narrowing section 1983 is not to preclude the appropriate remedy for plaintiffs but 
rather to preclude section 1988 attorney’s fees. If this is the Court’s main objective then it should 
fashion a more directly related exception. The Court should consider looking at the purpose 
intent of the enacted legislation.93 
The second potential narrowing effect and the one that this Paper is most concerned with 
is whether a finding of implied remedies in implied right of action cases will also reverse the 
presumption favoring 1983 relief.  As Part II illustrated, the Court readily applies the appropriate 
relief when it has found an implied right of action based on the principle that federal courts may 
grant all necessary relief when federal rights are violated.94  Consequently the second part of this 
discussion focuses on implied rights of action precluding section 1983 relief.  If the Court 
determines that the overall scheme of the statute does not foreclose finding an implied right, then 
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the Court might follow the Rancho Palos line of reasoning and consider whether the presence of 
an implied right of action forecloses section 1983 relief.  The finding of an express cause of 
action and implied remedies that were incompatible with section 1983 relief in the Rancho Palos 
decision could easily be expanded to finding implied remedies that are incompatible with section 
1983 in implied right of action cases.   
The very purpose of section 1983 was to ensure that constitutional and federal statutory 
rights could be vindicated.95 Likewise section 1988 was designed to assist in this goal by 
providing an incentive to attorneys to bring those actions.96 When a statute that does not 
expressly provide a right of action, but instead contains an implied right, an implied right of 
action and an implied remedies to vindicate that right, it seems to be too great an exercise of 
judicial interpretation to determine that the implied remedy precludes section 1983, when the 
statute is expressly silent to all of this. Reading too deeply into a statute for an intent to preclude 
section 1983 could result in arbitrary distinctions that may well contravene Congress’s intent 
behind promulgating sections 1983 and 1988.  
Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Association (Communities for 
Equity), which the Supreme Court remanded to the Sixth Circuit for reconsideration in light of 
the Rancho Palos decision, provides an illustration of what is at stake in implied right cases.  In 
Communities for Equity the plaintiffs prevailed on their equal protection claim and thus their 
Title IX claim was not decided.97  At issue is whether an implied right of action under Title IX 
would preclude relief under section 1983 for plaintiff’s equal protection claim in light of the 
Rancho Palos decision.98  Part IV discusses the Communities for Equity case and the role Title 
IX is poised to play in further implied right jurisprudence.  
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IV. TITLE IX’S ROLE IN ADDRESSING WHEN SECTION 1983 IS APPLICABLE TO IMPLIED 
RIGHT AND IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION CASES 
 
The Court’s reasoning in the Rancho Palos decision could be expanded so that a finding 
of implied remedies in implied right of action cases would also reverse the presumption favoring 
1983 relief. This is what is at stake in the circuit split concerning Title IX. Some circuits have 
held that the implied right of action in Title IX forecloses 1983,99 whereas other circuits, 
including the Sixth Circuit, say that nothing in Title IX forecloses 1983 relief.100 The Sixth 
Circuit’s most recently considered this issue in Communities for Equity.101 Although the 
Supreme Court has denied certiorari to Communities for Equity,102 the inevitable resolution of 
the circuit split will affect the possible role implied rights of action and implied remedies will 
play in implied right cases.   
Section A in this Part discusses the current relationship between implied rights of action 
and implied rights enforceable under section 1983.  It uses Title IX case law to highlight the 
issue of whether an implied right of action precludes section 1983 relief.  Section B explains the 
current Title IX controversy as illustrated in Communities for Equity and the potential Title IX 
may play in implied right jurisprudence.   
 
A. The Debate about Relationship Between Implied Rights and Implied Rights of Action using 
Title IX as an example. 
 
There have been a few implied right cases where a section 1983 claim was not raised but 
the Supreme Court still found an implied right of action and applied appropriate remedies.103  
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While section 1983 relief would have been precluded in some of the cases because someone 
other than a state actor violated federal right,104 the question of whether the statutes contain an 
implied right of action remains.  The Court has established and refined factors that should be 
considered in determining whether a statute contains an implied right of action.105  First, is the 
plaintiff a member of a class who is a special beneficiary to the statute?  Second, is there any 
explicit or implicit indication of legislative intent to either imply or preclude a private right of 
action?  Third, would implying a right of action be the consistent with the underlying scheme of 
the statute?  Finally, would a right of action be something traditionally left to the state?106  “The 
test reflects a concern, grounded in separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts 
controls the availability of remedies for violations of statutes.”107  In contrast, section 1983 cases 
lack these concerns because it is a source of express congressional authorization of private 
suits.108  
What the two types of rights of action do have in common is the presumption of the 
availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.109  
Thus it seems that the most significant distinction between implied rights of action with implied 
remedies and the remedies of a section 1983 action is the availability of attorney’s fees.  Section 
1988 is a fee shifting provision in which the prevailing party in section 1983 litigation may get 
their attorney’s fees paid by the losing party.110  The rational behind section 1988 is to vindicate 
important federal and constitutional values.111  Thus the question then becomes whether 
attorney’s fees should be awarded in non-civil rights and non-constitutional rights type actions.  
Thus, this Paper suggests that whether relief under section 1983 is available should not be 
premised on whether a separate implied right of action with implied remedies exists.  This 
section addresses the cases where a state actor violated a federal right and the Court was silent as 
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to section 1983’s applicability.112  Most at issue are those statutes where the Court has found an 
implied right of action without considering whether section 1983 would be an appropriate 
avenue for relief.   
Title IX seems to be the key battle ground in this debate.  In Cannon v. University of 
Chicago113 the Court held that private parties could sue to enforce the prohibitions of Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972114 against gender-based discrimination in any educational 
program supported by federal funds.115  The Court’s justification relied in part on the fact that 
Title IX had been derived from Title VI, that Congress understood private remedies were 
available under Title VI, and that Congress intended similar remedies under Title IX.116  The 
Cannon decision also presented a debate about the nature of Title IX authorization of private 
suits.  The Court recognized that  
“the language added to § 1988 by the 1976 amendment, and the 
legislative history surrounding it, do indicate that many members 
of Congress may have assumed that private suits were authorized 
under Title IX and, more importantly, that many Members felt that 
private enforcement of Title IX was entirely consistent with, and 
even necessary to, the enforcement of Title IX and the other 
statutes listed in § 1988.”117   
In another Title IX case, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,118 the Court found 
a limitation to Title IX implied rights of action. It held that for peer to peer sexual harassment a 
right of action would only be available if the recipient, state actor, acted with deliberate 
indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities.119 In Franklin v. Gwinnett 
Public School120 the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision that only equitable 
relief was available under Title IX and held that Title IX provided a damages remedy for the 
student alleging sexual harassment from a coach employed by the school district because the 
Court presumed the availability of all appropriate remedies unless the United States Congress 
had expressly indicated otherwise.121 
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One indication that not every provision of Title IX provides a private right of action is 
that in Alexander v. Sandoval,122 the Court held that there is no implied right of action under the 
disparate impact regulations of Title VI.123  Further evidence is found in the Cannon opinion as 
well where the Court stated that “[t]he supporters of the legislation did not intend it to amend 
Title IX to include an express cause of action where none existed before.  Instead, they clearly 
only meant to provide attorney's fees in the event that that statute as it had always existed 
implicitly created a cause of action.”124  The debate over implied rights of action in Title IX is 
still ongoing and is further complicated by section 1983’s role in it. Section B discusses the most 
recent Title IX right of action case.  
 
B. Communities for Equity: The most recent Chapter in the Implied Right, Implied Right of 
Action Debate.   
 
 Communities for Equity (CFE) a group comprised of parents and student athletes brought 
a class action lawsuit against the Michigan High School Athletic Association (MHSAA) alleging 
that MHSAA’s scheduling of sports seasons discriminates against female athletes.125  The district 
court concluded that MHSAA’s actions violated the Equal Protection Clause, Title IX, and 
Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.126  The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the ground that 
MHSAA’s scheduling of sports seasons violated the Equal Protection Clause and did not reach 
the Title IX and state law issues.127 The Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s decision and 
remanded the case for further consideration in light of Rancho Palos.128   
On remand the Sixth Circuit applied the Smith framework of the comprehensive 
enforcement mechanism to consider whether Title IX precluded a section 1983 claim for an 
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equal protection violation.129 It pointed to the fact that CFE brought a section 1983 claim only to 
redress the alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
critical distinction between the present case and Sea Clammers and Rancho Palos.130 
Accordingly it addressed two issues, “(1) whether CFE’s Title IX claims are “virtually identical” 
to its constitutional claims, and (2) whether the remedies provided in Title IX indicate the 
Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983.”131  The Sixth Circuit reached the second 
issue first and appropriately concluded that although there is an implied right of action under 
Title IX, Title IX does not contain a comprehensive enforcement mechanism—the only 
enforcement mechanism expressly authorized in Title IX is the withdrawal of federal funds.132  
Although Rancho Palos left open the possibility that implied rights of action could foreclose 
section 1983 relief, the Sixth Circuit reasonably declined to engage in that line of reasoning.  
 
V. LOOKING BEYOND REMEDIES AND ENFORCEMENT SCHEMES—DETERMINING SECTION 1983’S 
APPLICABILITY THROUGH OTHER AVENUES.  
 
This Part suggests an alternative method for determining whether section 1983 should 
apply to a particular statute. Apart from comprehensive enforcement mechanisms and statutorily 
created—expressly or impliedly—remedies, section 1983 could be precluded through a 
purposive approach.133 A purposive approach would include looking to the legal context in 
which both the legislation at issue and sections 1983 and 1988 were enacted, which would 
include the prevailing judicial precedents at the time.134 Formulating a determination on whether 
a section 1983 action is foreclosed premised on those two legal contexts and purposes will best 
effectuate Congressional intent and avoid arbitrary judicial decisions.135  Much case law 
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recognizes the primary purpose of section 1983, which is to aid in a broad remedy for violations 
of federally protected civil rights.136  Section 1988 was enacted for similar purposes—it was 
intended to protect important federal and constitutional values.137   
Indeed Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Rancho Palos advocated for such an approach.  
He argued that the context in which the Telecommunications Act was enacted shows that 
Congress saw a national problem, namely the inconsistent and patchy state and local wireless 
communication requirements.138  In rejecting the possibility of deploying a national wireless 
communication system, Congress decided in favor of leaving states and local authorities free to 
make certain decisions subject to minimum federal standards and judicial review.139  Thus the 
purpose of the statute was to ensure wireless communications were consistently regulated. In 
light of section 1983’s purpose to aid in remedy civil rights violations, it seems that section 1983 
should not apply to the Telecommunications Act. Also it is questionable whether the 
Telecommunications Act even creates an implied right.140  
Applying the purposive approach to Title IX further illustrates its utility.  While the 
history of Title IX is complex and fraught with a certain level of ambiguity, there are indicators 
that granting relief under section 1983 has not be foreclosed by Congress in Title IX implied 
rights of action cases. First section 1988 was amended to expressly provide for attorney’s fees in 
Title IX actions.141  Second Congress has not specifically foreclosed the use of section 1983 to 
vindicate Title IX violations.  In contrast, Congress is currently considering an amendment to 
section 1988 and section 1983 that would foreclose section 1983 relief and section 1988 
attorney’s fees for statutes prohibiting picketing at military and other funerals.142  Even if 
Congress’s lack of action is not a sufficient indication the section 1983 still applies to Title IX 
there is other evidence apart from Congressional intent that supports this conclusion. A section 
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1983 action does not circumvent Title IX procedures, or afford additional remedies not available 
in Title IX.143 
Although there is debate about whether every provision of Title IX allows for a private right 
of action, it is clear that if there is an implied right of action then section 1988 attorney’s fees 
may be awarded to the prevailing plaintiff.  Further, both equitable relief and damages are 
available under Title IX.  Because attorney’s fees and all necessary remedies are available under 
an implied right of action under Title IX, nothing in Title IX is incompatible with affording 
section 1983 relief.  Recall that the Court found inconsistencies between the express right of 
action and implied remedies in the Telecommunications Act and section 1983. It found the 30 
day statute of limitations to be incompatible with the general rule that the state statute of 
limitations for personal-injury torts apply when bringing claims under section 1983.144 Further it 
reasoned that section 1988’s attorney’s fee provision would have the severe impact by making 
local governments liable for legal expenses of large commercial interests.145  Both of these 
concerns are absent in Title IX’s provisions. Thus under both a purposive approach and even in 
light of Rancho Palos Title IX would not preclude section 1983 relief.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Currently the relationship between implied rights enforceable through implied rights of 
action and implied rights enforceable under section 1983 is in a state of flux.  Whether implied 
rights of action with implied remedies will be used to foreclose section 1983 relief has yet to be 
determined.  This Paper has attempted to outline the current issues surrounding the implied right 
of action debate.  It suggests that implied rights of action and implied remedies are ill suited—
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either as comprehensive enforcement mechanisms or under the Rancho Palos reasoning—for 
precluding section 1983.  It argued that preclusion of section 1983 relief in implied right, implied 
right of action, or implied remedy cases should be premised on the history and congressional 
intent behind section 1983 and 1988.  
The Supreme Court remanded Communities for Equity to the Sixth Circuit for 
reconsideration in light of Rancho Palos.  The Sixth Circuit has again affirmed the district 
court’s decision by holding that Title IX lacks a comprehensive enforcement mechanism to 
evidence Congress’s intent to foreclose section 1983 relief.146  Although the Supreme Court has 
declined to grant certiorari to Communities for Equity,147 eventually it will rule on the circuit 
split on whether Title IX forecloses section 1983 relief. In the meantime though, courts, 
specifically the Supreme Court, should reconsider what can preclude section 1983’s application. 
Implied rights, implied rights of action, and implied remedies should not be used to foreclose 
section 1983 actions. While the ultimate outcome in Rancho Palos that section 1983 does not 
apply to the Telecommunications Act seems appropriate, the Court should have used alternative 
means to foreclose a 1983 action.  
Further when the Court does rule on the Title IX circuit split it should hold that Title IX 
does not preclude section1983 relief. There is no evidence of congressional intent to foreclose 
section 1983 relief in Title IX implied rights of action cases. More broadly, the Rancho Palos 
presumption favoring remedies granted in a statute as the exclusive avenue for relief should not 
apply when the statute does not contain express remedy provisions. Even if the Court declines to 
limit this presumption the Court should determine that Rancho Palos does not apply in implied 
right-implied right of action cases. 
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